伽利略完成全球首次民用认证GNSS定位验证

Galileo achieves first-ever civil authenticated GNSS position using Signal Authentication Service (SAS) On 16 September, Galileo achieved a major milestone in satellite navigation resilience by demonstrating the first-ever civil GNSS position authenticated through both navigation data and ranging information. The demonstration used the Galileo Signal Authentication Service (SAS) concept, with five Galileo satellites transmitting encrypted signal components over Europe. Receivers on the ground successfully processed these signals to compute an authenticated position fix, demonstrating a new level of protection for civil satellite navigation. First authenticated position with Galileo satellites On 16 September, between 14:00 and 16:00 UTC, five Galileo satellites—E06, E21, E23, E34 and E36—encrypted one of their signal components, the E6-C signal at 1278.75 MHz, normally transmitted in the clear. Several Galileo SAS receivers deployed at different locations successfully processed these signals in combination with Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA). For the first time, a civil GNSS receiver was able to process authenticated navigation data and ranging measurements from at least four satellites simultaneously and compute an authenticated position fix. A significant part of the demonstration took place during Jammertest on the island of Andøya, Norway, where controlled GNSS jamming and spoofing tests are conducted using real over-the-air signals. This provided a unique opportunity to evaluate Galileo SAS under both nominal conditions and many types of spoofing. During the spoofing tests, conventional receivers were deceived and reported false positions, while the Galileo SAS receiver detected the attack and maintained a trusted position solution based on authenticated Galileo signals. Strengthening GNSS against spoofing Spoofing is the transmission of counterfeit GNSS signals designed to mislead a receiver about its position or time. It is a significant threat to satellite navigation, with incidents affecting sectors such as aviation and maritime transport. Historically, civil GNSS receivers have had limited means to verify that the signals they use genuinely originate from navigation satellites. Galileo addressed part of this vulnerability through OSNMA, declared operational in 2025, which authenticates the navigation data transmitted by Galileo satellites. SAS complements OSNMA by protecting the other fundamental source of informat…